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DEVALUATION  CRISES  AND THE MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF POSTPONED  ADJUSTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops  our analytical  model to explore the relationship 
between the dynamics of macroeconomic  adjustment and the timing  of the 
implementation  of an adjustment  program featuring  an official devaluation. 
The  effects of postponing  adjustment  depend  on the source  of the original 
shock,  In the case of fiscal  expansion,  postponement implies  a larger 
eventual official devaluation  and greater  deviations of macroeconomic 
variables from their steady-state  values.  For adverse terms of trade 
shocks,  postponement  does not affect the size of the eventual official 
devaluation,  but does magnify the amount of post-devaluation  overshooting  by 
key macroeconomic  variables. 
Sebastian  Edwards  Peter  Montiel 
Department  of Economics  Research Department 
University of California  International  Monetary Fund 
Los Angeles, CA  90024  Washington,  DC  20431 I.  Introduction 
An important issue  in the design of stabilization  programs refers to 
the  :iminz  of different  policies.  In particular,  determining  the consequ- 
ences of alternative timings  of devaluations  has for a long time concerned 
policymakers in the developing  countries.  In spite of this policy 
interest the literature  on stabilization  and devaluation  has not analyzed 
this  issue  in detail.  The purpose of this paper is to develop a general 
equilibrium  dynamic model to explore  the relationship between the dynamics 
of macroeconomic adjustment  and the  timing  of the  implementation  of a 
stabilization  program that includes  a nominal devaluation as its principal 
component. / In particular,  we explore the effects of postponing 
adjustment  on the cumulative  deviations  of key macroeconomic  variables 
from their  steady-state  values  and on the degree  of overshooting  of these 
values following the  implementation  of adjustment  measures. 
The model is derived from  well-articulated  micro foundations  and 
distinguishes  between equilibrium  and disequilibrium  movements in real 
exchange rates.  We investigate  the characteristics  of two different types of 
exchange rate crises:  (a) those  provoked  by inconsistent  fiscal  policies 
and (b) those  generated  by exogenous  terms  of trade shocks.  A central 
aspect of our discussion  is determining  conditions  under which a nominal 
devaluation  will be required to render  the adjustment  process effective. 
j/  A number of authors have investigated  the process of macroeconomic 
adjustment in developing  countries.  Most studies,  however, have focused 
on a particular aspect  of the adjustment  process,  without providing a 
general and integrated  picture that "fits"  (or is consistent  with) the 
more salient stylized facts.  See,  for example,  Blanco and Garber (1986), 
Connolly et al.  (1987),  Rodriguez (1978), Khan and Lizondo (1987),  Krugman 
(1979)  and Edwards (1983). This is,  indeed,  an important  policy issue,  since  the cole of devaluations 
has for some time now been at the centet of conttoveraies  surrounding  the 
so-called  orthodox adjustment  programs.  L  An  important  innovation  of  our 
analysis  is that it relates the timing  of adjustment  to the size of the 
(corrective)  devaluation, and thereby  to the path of a number of key macro- 
economic  variables during the disequilibrium  process and the adjustment 
period. 
In developing  our model  we make a special  effort to capture the more 
important  stylized facts associated  with balance of paymenta crises,  devalu- 
ations  and stabilization  programs.  For this reason,  ye start in Section Il 
with a brief exposition of those  facts,  in Section  ill  ccc  present the 
model,  while in Section IV ye illustrate  how the model works.  Here ye con- 
centrate on two possible causes of devsluation  crises:  fiscal shocks and 
exogenous shocks  to the international  terms of trade.  The central part of 
this  section  deals with the consequences  of postponing  adjustment  and 
devaluation,  Finally, Section  V contains  the concluding  remarka, including 
some thoughts  regarding directions  for future  research. 
II.  Macroeconomic Polity,  Real Exchange  Rates and 
and Devaluation  Crises:  The Stylized Facts 
In this section we briefly analyze  the circumstances  preceding 20 major 
devaluation  crises in developing  countries.  Our main interest is to provide 
a simple "list'  of the most salient  atylized faota  that,  we believe, should 
be captured  by a unified model that  deals  with devaluation  crises and macro- 
economic adjustment  processes.  We focus  both on policy induced disturbances 
-  - shocks  to domestic credit as well as fiscal  polity- 
- and  on  external 
j/  See,  for example,  Buire (1983). shocks in the form of terms  of trade  changes.  We then analyze the behavior 
of the following  endogenous  variables:  (1) real exchange rates; (2) the 
current account; (3) the monetary system's foreign assets position; 
(4) the black market premium; and (5) real  wages. 
1.  The Sample 
Table 1 contains the list of the  20 devaluation  episodes analyzed in 
this  paper.  The choice  of countries in the sample  was basically determined 
by data availability;  only those  major devaluation  episodes for which data 
on (most)  of the variables of interest  were available  were incorporated into 
the analysis.  All these countries  devalued their currencies  by at least J.57 
after having maintained  a fixed (official)  exchange rate with respect to the 
tJ.S, dollar for two or more years.  Thirteen of them implemented  a stepwiae 
devaluation,  where after the nominal exchange  rate adjustment  they attempted 
to once again  fix the parity (Panel A of Table 1),  Many of them did not 
succeed and experienced  recurrent  devaluations.  Seven of the countries 
adopted a crawling exchange rate after devaluing (Panel  B).  This table also 
contains data on the amount  of each nominal devaluation  measured as the 
percentage  change of the official exchange  rate with respect to the U.S. 
dollar.  It is interesting  to note that  all of these devaluations  were fol- 
lowed  by some kind of predetermined  regime (either fixed  or passive crawl) 
and not by a freely floating nominal  rate,  as most theoretical  models of 
exchange rate collapse have assumed (Krugman,  1979;  Flood and Garber 1984; 
Obstfeld 1986)  .  In  the model we developed  below we take this important 
stylized fact into account and deal  with exchange  rate crisis  where the of- 
ficial  exchange rate is fixed  at a new (higher)  level after the devaluation. -4- 
Table 1.  Devaluation  Crises in Selected Developing  Countries: 
Rate of Devaluation  (percentage)  1/ 
(Percentage  of Devaluation) 
Year of 
Devaluation 
Country  Crisis 
One Year 
Year of  After 





A.  Stepwise Devaluations 
34.3  0.0  0.0  50.0  Colombia  1962 
Colombia 
.  1965 
Costa  Rica  1974 
50.0  0.0 





Cyprus  1967 
Guyana  1967 
India  1966 
16.6  0.0 
15.9  0.9 







Israel  1962  66.6  0.0  0,0  0.0 
Israel  1967  16.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Israel  1971  20.0  0.0  0.0  7.1 
nicaragua  1979 
Pakistan  1972 
43.0  0.0 





Sri Lanka  1967  24.1  0.0  0.5  0.0 
Yugoslavia  1965  66.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 
.  Devaluations Followed by Crawling  Peg 
88.2  19.2  46.5  43.3  Chile  1982 
Colombia  1967  16.7  7.1  5.7  6.9 
Kenya  1981 
Korea  1980 
35.9  23.7 





Mexico  1976  59.6  13.9  -0.0  0.3 
Mexico  1982  267.8  49.1  33.7  93.0 
Pakistan  1982  29.6  5.1  13.7  4.0 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. 
j/  Devaluation  of the official rate with respect to the U.S.  dollar.  In 
the case of multiple rates  the IFS reports  the  most common  of them. The data in Tab  1 refer to the official  exchange rate.  Many of these 
countries,  however,  had an active parallel  market during the period sur- 
rounding the devaluations.  In subsection  11.5  below we discuss the behavior 
of the parallel market  exchange rate.  The existence of this parallel market 
is another important  stylized fact not captured  by traditional  models,  but 
explicitly  incorporated in our unified model. 
2  Fiscal  and Credit  Policies and Devaluation  Crises 
Table 2  summarizes  the behavior of domestic credit  and fiscal policies 
for the period immediately  preceding the 20 devaluation  crises.  In addi- 
tion,  data for a control zrou  of countries  that maintained a fixed rate 
for 10 or more years are also presented.  L/  The following indicators  can be 
found in this table:  (1) rate of growth  of domestic credit (Panel  A); 
(2) rate of growth  of domestic  credit to the public sector (Panel  B) 
(3) percentage  of credit received  by the public  sector as proportion  of 
total  domestic credit (Panel  C)  ;  (4) fiscal  deficit as proportion of GD? 
(Panel  D)  ;  and (5) growth  of domestic credit  to the public sector as a 
proportion  of CNP.  All these indicators  have been constructed  using data 
from  various issues  of the International  Financial  Statistics as well as 
several IFS tapes.  For the devaluing  countries these  indicators  are 
reported for  3 years, 2 years, and 1 year prior to the devaluation  as well 
as for the year of the devaluation. While Panel A  deals with monetary (or 
domestic credit)  policy,  the rest of the panels  take us beyond the monetary 
LI  Extreme care should  be taken  when using "control  groups" to perform 
macroeconomic  empirical studies.  See Goldstein and Montiel (1986),  and 
Edwards (l989b).  See Appendix for the countries  in the control group. -6- 
Table 2.  indicators  of Macroeconomic  Policy In Devaluing  Countries During 
Year of Devaluation  and 3  Years Preceding  Devaluation: 
Comparison  to Control Group of Fixers 
Three Years  Two Years  1 Year 
Prior to  Prior  to  Prior to  Year of  Control 
Devaluation  Devaluation  Devaluation  Devaluation  Group 
A.  Annual_Rate nF (Drv,.rrh nF flnr-i,  1- (Pro 
Source:  See text. 
13.8  12.3  15.7  First  Quartile  11.9 
Median  .  22.1 
Third Quartile  34.8 
Mean  23.5 
B,  Annual Rate of Growth  of 
First Quartile  7.8 
Median  24.4 
Third Quartile  66.5 
Mean  43.1 
C.  Ratio of Domestic Credit 
(Ratio x 100) 
First  Quartile  11.3 
Median  26.0 
Third Quartile  46,5 





22.9  17.4 
40.6  29.9 
22.8  21.2  35.4  19.3 







11.2  0 
31.0  22.7 
69.2  33.2 
28.3  29.8  58.9  5.7 























D.  Fiscal Deficit 



































to Public  Sector  as Proportion 
0.7  0.09  -0.5 
1.7  1.09  1.1 
3.9  2.6  2.9 
2.4  1.5  1.5 -7- 
realm and into the fiscal side of the economy.  Indeed,  these panels provide 
four different  ways of looking at fiscal  pressures. 
A  number of revealing  facts emerge from  this table.  First, macro- 
economic-  -and in particular fiscal- -policies  became increasingly expansive 
in the devaluing  countries immediately  preceding the year of the devalua- 
tion.  Second,  the devaluing countries  as a group behaved quite differ- 
ently than the control group of fixers.  This is particularly clear for the 
fiscal  policy indicators,  For example, during  the year prior to the 
crisis  half of the devaluing countries  allocated  one quarter or more of 
total domestic credit  to the public sector;  the median for the control group 
countries, on the other hand,  was only slightly  more than 10 percent. 
Formal.  tests  indicate  that the probability  of these  policy indicators 
for the devaluing  countries  coming from  the same population as the control 
group is very low. j/  This strong empirical  evidence suggests a third 
feature  that any model that attempts to capture  the dynamics of crisis and 
stabilization  should possess, i.e.,  it should  have a well developed fiscal 
side. 
3.  Terms of Trade and Devaluation  Crises 
Of course,  balance of payments difficulties  are not always the result 
of inconsistent  domestic macroeconomic  policies;  historically, exogenous 
shocks  have sometimes  been the sources of serious  external imbalances,  in 
our sample there is a wide variety of experience.  While in some  episodes 
the terms of trade did not change in the period  preceding the exchange rare 
j./  The values of the x2 statistics  ranged  from 9.1  to 14.6.  This 
Statistic has  degrees of freedom. -8- 
collapse,  in others there  was a substantial  change.  In aix of the  fxteen 
episodes for which there  are data there  was  a significant  worsening in 
the terms of trade  before the devaluation  (see Appendix,  Table Al). 1/ 
Existing  models of exchange rate collapse,  however,  have ignored the 
possibility  of terms  of trade  shocks  being the generating  cause of 
devaluations.  This possibility  is explicitly  taken  up in our model. 
4.  Real Exchanze Rates,  The External  Sector and Devaluations 
In the vaar majority of our 20 devaluation  episodes the external aecror 
experienced  a aerious deterioration  in the period leading  to the criaia.  In 
16 out of the 20 episodes the ratio  of net foreign  assets to money experi- 
enced a steep decline during  this two year period (see Appendix, Table A.2). 
This,  of course,  is in acrord  with the traditional  modela of exchange rare 
crises developed  by Krugmen (1979) and others,  where the devaluation takes 
place when the  level  of international  reserves  hire a lower  threshold.  2/ 
Also,  in 14 of the 20 episodes  the current  account ratio  experienced a 
worsening in the two years  before the crisis,  In fact,  in some of these 
episodes the current account to GDP ratio reached remarkable  levels.  In 
Kenya and Israel 1971 the deficit  was approximately  equal to one-fourth of 
GDP!  An important  characteristic  of these  devaluation  episodes ia the 
tendency,  present in most countries,  for the ratio  of net foreign assets to 
return to its pre-crisis level  following  the devaluation.  This suggests 
that  countries have a well-established  desired level of reserves to which 
j/  We have arbitrarily  defined "significant"  as a decline in the terms of 
trade of at least  5%. 
2/  Notice  that these  are  foreign  assets  of the monetary system; thus, 
its evolution includes  private capital  movements including capital flight. they seek to return.  This characteristic,  which has been ignored in the 
literature, is explicitly  incorporated in our model. 
Regarding real exchange rates,  in 15 out of the  19 countries wsth 
relevant data the bilateral real exchange rate experienced  a real apprecia 
tion in the  three  years prior to the devaluation; in 13 out of the 19 cases 
there also was a real appreciation of the multilateral  RER during the period 
immediately  preceding the crisis.  The average real appreciation during the 
3 years preceding the devaluation  crisis  was almost 9.2 percent, while the 
real multilateral appreciation  was 9.01 (see Appendix,  Table A.3). 1/  These 
real appreciations  were the result of domestic  rates of inflation that 
increasingly exceeded the world rate of inflation.  A set of  x2  tests,  in 
fact,  indicate that as the crisis date approached  the rate of CPI  inflation 
in the devaluing countries  became  more distinct from that of the fixed rate 
control  group.  This evidence is particularly important  for determining our 
modelling strategy.  What these  data suggest is that devaluation  decisions 
are based on the behavior of (at least) two indicators:  foreign reserves 
and the real exchange rates.  It is possible to think  of some devaluations 
as undertaken in order to improve  a country's  competitive  position rather 
than  because reserves have disappeared Indonesia  in 1978  comes to mind) 
This means that,  contrary to the traditional  literature,  a model that 
attempts to capture the stylized facts surrounding  crises in the LOGs should 
j/  Naturally, to the extent that there  have not been changes in the 
equilibrium  RERs,  this  appreciation  reflects  a disequilibrium  situation 
(i.e.,  real overvaluation).  Notice that the extent of real exchange rate 
appreciation before the crisis  not only varied  across countries,  but also 
was more marked in recent  years (i.e.,  in the l980s).  This has been parti- 
cularly the case for the countries that after the devaluation  became 
crawlers. -  IC 
explicitly incorporate  nontradeble  gooca and. b  .i,  the  possibility of 
domestic rnflaticn exceeding  world inflation  - 
A  particularly interesting  feature of  tCese  ,ra is that in many 
episodes the authorities  postponed  the irpl-  ntion  of the  adjustaeor 
measures, ever after it had become evident cta tne eoonoay was facing a 
severe  maccceconomic  disequilibrium.  Moreo'er,  in a number of cases in its 
effort  to postpone the adjustment  the  government  resorted to exchange and 
capital controls 'Edwards  1989aj, 
5  Devaluation Crises  and Black  Msrket  Premia 
We  could obtain inforration rn  ne black market  rate for foreign 
exchange for cost of the countries  In  our sample.  These  data are,  in fatt, 
extremely suggeetive,  showing a  marked-increase it  the premium  in the period 
leading  to the exchange rate collapse.  In all but rae of the episodes  the 
black market  premium  was  higher one month  before the devaluation  than  3  yeats 
prior  to the devaluation (see Appendix,  Table AC'  -  It is interesting  to 
note that in every  country isssediately following the devaluation  the parallel 
market  premium experienced  a sudden  downward jump  This type of behavior is, 
in fact.  consistent  with perfect foresight  models of the  rvpe developed by 
Lizondo (l98Ta,  and Kiguel and Lizondo (1986,.  It the acdci we developed 
below we also incorporate  this  feature ci the parallel  racket behavior. 
6.  Devaluation  Crises  and Real Wagg.. 
Critics of orthodox stabilization  programs  have argued that devalu- 
ations result in important  reductions in real wages. / In order to 
analyze this issue  we collected data on the evolution  of teal wages in the 
j/  See,  for example, Pastor (1986). -  11 
manufacturing  sector in the period  surrounding  our devaluation  crises (see 
Appendix, Table A.5).  Since these  data have not been corrected by product 
ivity  gains, they should  be analyzed  with care.  These figures show no 
clearcut behavior of real  manufacturing  wages in the period surrounding the 
devaluation  crises.  In only 8 out of 18 episodes for which there are data, 
real wages increased  in the period preceding the crisis.  In all of these 
eight cases real wages dropped after the devaluation.  in the other 
episodes for which there  are data,  real  wages did not decline after the 
crisis.  Thus,  the popular belief that all devaluations are followed by a 
wage  reduction is not sustained  by our data. 
7,  Summary 
The  data discussed  in this section provide a fairly  clearcut pattern 
regarding the stylized facts  surrounding  a large  number of devaluation 
crises in the developing  countries.  These facts--which  we believe an 
adequate  model of devaluation  crises  should capture-  -can  be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
a.  Historically the vast majority of devaluation  crises  have been 
preceded by loose  and inconsistent  macroeconomic  policies.  In particular, 
the evidence shows that fiscal  policy in the devaluing  countries as a group 
was significantly  more expansive than in a control group  of fixers. 
b.  In  a  nontrivial number of episodes we  detected  a  significant 
worsening  in the international terms of trade immediately  before  the  crisis. 
This  suggests chat historically  some collapses  may have been caused by 
exogenous external shocks. 
c  lfl  the period preceding the devaluations  we observed (a) a 
significant real  exchange rate appreciation;  (b)  the depletion ad the s0c5 22  - 
of  international  reserves; (c) a deterioration  of the  current account 
defioit  and;  (d)  a decline in the ratio of  for  gn  assets of the 
monetary system. 
d.  Devaluations  crises have been preceded  by very steep increases in 
the black market  premium.  Moreover, the evidence  shows that ir.mediately 
following  the devaluation the premium experienced  a significant decline. 
e.  Regarding real wages, the evidence is less clear.  There are  some 
indications,  however, that in acme countries  reel wages followed an 
inverted  U  path.  They increased in  the years preceding the crisis, and 
dropped in the years that followed. 
III.  The Model 
In this  section  we develop  a model  of a typical  developing country 
which is designed to trace the dynamic response  of certain key macroeconomic 
variables to a variety of shocks  that  eventually  culminate in a devaluation 
episode.  The model is able to generate dynamic responses  which mimic quite 
closely the stylized facts  described  above.  It turns out that,  for a given 
shock  whioh eventually  results in adjustment-ca-devaluation, the primary 
determinants  of the path followed  by domestic  macroeconomic variables are 
the nature of the eventual  macroeconomic  adjustment  to the shock and the 
magnitude  of the associated  devaluation. 
1.  Surely 
We consider a small open  economy which produces  exportables (X) 
importables (Z)  and nontraded  goods (N) using sector-specific  capital and -  13 
oomogeneous  labor.  L/  Labor  is available  in fixed supply,  and all prices 
are flexible; full employment  prevails continuously.  The labor  market 
equilibrium  condition is: 
(1)  Lx(w/p) + L(w) + L(we)  I. 
ere  w is the real wage measured in terms of importables,  p is the 
domestic price of exportables  in terms of importables (i.e.  the external 
ter'ns  of trade),  and e is the real  exchange rate,  defined as the ratio of 
the domestic price of importables  to that of nontraded goods; e  sP/P;, 
where s is the predetermined  nominal exchange rate applicable to comlnerciai 
transactions  and P  is the world price  of importables.  Lj is the demand 
for labor  n sector i,  and LI  0,  Equation (1) implies  relationship 
between  p, e, and the equilibrium  real wage: 
(2)  w  w(p,e), 
wl  (w/p2)/(/p+L+Le)  > 0;  w2  -(Lw)/(/p+L+Le) < 0 
Since  each sector  employs only one variable factor,  conventional secroral 
supply functions that relate  output in each sector  to the two relative 
prices p and e can be derived. 
(3)  1X  yx(pe);  yz  yZ(Pe);  yN  yN(pe) 
Consequently, an improvement  in the  terms  of trade increases output of 
exportables  while reducing that  of importables  and nontraded goods.  A real 
exchange rate depreciation,  on the other hand,  increases  output of import- 
ables and exportables  while reducing that  of nontraded goods. 
1/  This model is partially  based on Khan and Montiel (1987).  It differs 
from Khan and Montiel in that it incorporates  a dual exchange rate market 
and ignores  the bond market.  Kiguel and Lizondo (1986)  and Edwards (1988) 
present models somewhat similar  to that  developed  here, -  14  - 
2.  Demand 
a.  Household  Sector 
We assume  that  households  consume  only importables  and noncradable 
goods.  To simplify the analysis  we suppose that  households'  utility 
functions  are Cobh-Douglas.  This implies constant  expenditure  shares 
(denoted  6  for importables  and 1-6 for nontradable  goods) and permits us to 
write an 'exact"  price  index  P as: 
1-6  6-1 
(4)  P =  P5e 
where P  and P4 are the domestic-currency  prices  of importables  of non- 
tradables,  Letting  c denote  real  consumption  measured in units of the 
consumption  bundle  with price  P,  the household  demand functions  for 
importables  and nontradable  goods  can be written  as: 
z  6-1 
(5a;  t  —  fiPc/Pz  be  c 
(Sb)  c4  (l-6)Fc/PN  (l-6)e8c 
Real household  consumption,  in turn,  is taken to depend  on real 
disposable  factor  income  and real financial  wealth: 
(6)  c  c(y-t,a);  c  > 4,  c  > 0 
where y is real factor  income,  t is real  (lump sum)  taxes,  and a is real 
financial  wealth,  all measured in  terms of the consumption  bundle.  Real 
taxes  on households  are  taken  to be exogenous. 
Real factor  income  can be expressed  as the product of the relative 
price  of imports measured in terms of the consumption  bundle and real factor 
income  in terms of importables: 
18  x  z  (7)  y — e  (py +y +e  y )  = y(p,e). 
From equation  (7)  it follows that  an improvement  in the  terms  of trade -  15  - 
increases  real factor  income,  while a real exchange  depreciation  has an 
ambiguous  impact  on this  variable.  j/ 
Household financial  wealth  consists  of domestic  money and foreign 
exchange.  The economy  is assumed  to operate  under a dual nominal exchange 
rate system,  consisting  of a predetermined  official exchange  rate for cur- 
rent transactions  and a freely-fluctuating  rate which governs  transactions 
.n foreign exchange  among  private  citizens. / Consequently  changes  re 
desired stock  of foreign  money  will result  in changes in the freely floacir.g 
rate  without accompanying  capital  flows.  In that sense  the stock of foreign 
exchange in private  hands  at any one  time reflects  past central  bank inter- 
vention in the dual exchange  market,  i.e.,  it is exogenous  when measured in 
foreign  currency  units.  Letting H denote the stock  of money,  F the 
foreign-currency  value of the stock  of foreign  exchange  held by the private 
sector  and d the dual exchange rate, real household  financial  wealth  is: 
a  M+dF)/F.  it is convenient  to write this as: 
(8)  a 
where  m  M/P  and v — dF/P.  Finally,  we assume that households  continu- 
ously  maintain their financial  portfolios  in their  desired composition, 
which is specified in conventional  fashion  as a function  of the nominal rate 
of return  on the money substitute  and of income: 
(9)  m(d,y);  m1< 0, m2 
> 0, 
J The  initial  steady  state  around  which the model  will be solved  below 
viii have the poperty that y  — 0.  This will be he  case when the country 
is initially  neither  a net international  debtor  nor creditor,  since in this 
case  (l-)y  y/e  (see  Khan and  Montiel (1987)). 
ZI  The literature  on dual exchange  markets  in developing  countries  is now 
quite  extensive.  For recent  expositions,  see Lizondo  '1.987a,b) and 
Dornbusch  (1986). -  16  - 
where  a  is  the expected rate of depreciation  of the dual exchange  rate, 
which  under the assumption  of perfect  foresight  is equal  to the actual  rate 
of devaluation. 
To complete the description  of household  behavior,  the accumulation  of 
domestic  money is given by the household  budget constraint: 
Ft 
or equivsiently: 
(10)  th  e8l(ytc) 
-  P5m. 
b.  Public  Sector 
The government levies taxes on households  and purchases  both 
importables and nontradable goods.  It finances any resulting deficit by 
borrowing  from the central  bank,  Its budget  constraint  is given  by: 
(11)  def  g5 + eJgN 
- 
where  g5  and gN denote  government  spending  on importables  and nontradable 
goods respectively  and  def  is the government  deficit  measured in terms of 
importables.  Initially,  the government  is assumed  to allocate its spending 
in  the  same proportions  as  households: 
(12a)  gZ  Oe0g 
(12b)  gN  (1-9)e8g, 
where g is cotal  real government  spending  meaaured  in units of the 
consumption  bundle, 
The final  agent in  the model is the central bank,  which issues  money to 
finance  government  deficits  and to purchase  foreign exchange in the offitial 
market generated  by trade  balance  surpluses.  The balance of trade  measured 
in terms  of imporcables,  denoted  b, is given  by: -  17  - 
(13)  b — py +  -  cZ  gZ 
Thus,  at any instant  the stock  of money in domestic  currency  units (M) is 
given  by: 
(14)  M  5  (b(u)  + def(u))  P(u)du. 
The domestic-currency  value of the stock  of international  reserves (which we 
denote  R) depends  on the current  official  exchange rate,  rather  than on the 
rate that  prevailed  at the  time the foreign  exchange  was purchased  by the 
central  bank: 
(15)  R  Sf b(u)P*(u)du. 
3,  Equilibrium 
Since the economy in question  is small, domestic-currency  prices  of 
exportables  and importables  are governed  by the law of one price: 
(16)  P  sP;  Pz 
as we abstract from  world inflation  and assume that the exchange rate for 
current  account transactions  is fixed,  the domestic  currency  prices of X 
and Z are constant. 
Equilibrium  in the nontradable  goods  market  is given  by: 
+ gN 
Using (3),  (5b),  (6),  (7) and  (8), this becomes 
(17)  yN(p,e)  (l-O)e8  c[y(p,e)-t,e(m+v)J  + 
This  equation  can be solved  for the real  exchange  rate chat  clears the 
market  for nontradable  goods.  To do  so,  it is convenient  to assume that  the -  18 
- 
initial equilibrium is characterized by  trade balance equilibrium,  in this 
case,  it can be shown thar  y  = 0.  j/  The solution  for e  ia given  by: 
(18)  e  e(p,gN.r,m+v) 
with  the following  expressions  for the partial derivatives: 
[yN 
-  (l-9)e0c1y[  /  0;  e2  -l/  < 0; 
es  (l/9)e8c1  /  0;  eq  -(1--G)ec2 / < 0, 
where  8(l-8)e8c +  (l-9)°c2(m+v) 
- y >  0. 
The model  il aolved  by combining  equation (18) with equations  (9) and 
(10) to yield a system  of two differential  equationa in  or and v.  To do so, 
notice  first that,  since F and Tz are both exogenous,  and since  we will be 
considering  only discrete  changes in these variables,  the definition  of v 
implies  char a  .  Making use of this property, equation (9) can be 
written  as: 
(19)  — h(p,m/v),  where 
h1 — -m2y/m > 0;  h2  1/rn1 < 0. 
Similarly,  substituting  (18)  in  (10) produces: 
(20)  th  g(p,gN,t,m+v),  where 
gl  y1(l-c) 
-  c2eil(l9)(m+v)el  > 0;  g2  0209)e(m+')e2  > 0 
-(1-c1) 
-  (l-O)c2e1(m+v)e3 < 0;  g  -c2[(l-G)e(a+v)eq+l[  < 0, 
where  all derivatives  are evaluated  at  ir  = '9  0. 2! 
The equilibrium  defined  by  th  '9  = 0 can be shown  to he saddle-point 
stable.  The determinant  of the system  consisting  of the linearized  versions 
of (19) and (20> is given  by: 
1/  See Khan and Montrel (198'). 
2/  The sign of g  is derived  after  substituting  for eq from  equation 
(18)  - -  19  - 
(21>  -h2g4(l+m/v)  < 0, 
so the  roots  are indeed  of opposite sign.  The phase  diagram for this system 
is depicted  in Figure  1.  The equations  th  — 0  and "  —  0  trace  out a pair of 
loci in  rn-v space  with slopes  given  by; 
— -I,  and 
1,:,0 
— v*/m* > 0. 
The signs of the arrows  are derived from the partial derivatives  in (18> and 
(20),  and the saddle  path  SS  through  the equilibrium  point A must have a 
positive  slope. j/  Thus,  along  stable  paths  the real money supply and the 
premium in  the dual exchange  market  will tend to move in the same direction. 
IV.  The Role of Devaluation 
To analyze  the workings  of the model,  we consider the effects of the 
two types of shocks  which in Section II we associated  with a devaluation 
crisis- -an expansionary  fiscal  shock  consisting  of an increase in govern- 
ment spending  on nontradable  goods,  and an adverse  terms  of trade shock.  We 
begin this section  by analyzing  the role of a nominal official devaluation 
in our model.  We then analyze  the effects  of an expansionary  fiscal shock 
and of a permanent  adverse  terms  of trade  shock in consecutive  subsections. 
jJ  The slope  of the saddle  path SS is given  by: 
h 
dv  2  —  —  >0, 
dm  m 
SS  l'2 
V 
where 'l is the negative  root. V 
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1.  The  Role  of  Devaluation 
A  steady-state  configuration  such  as  A  in  Figure  1  is characterized  by 
— 0.  By differentiating  equation (14), this can be shown to imply that 
b — -def.  However,  this condition is not sufficient  to ensure that a point 
like  A will be sustainable.  Assuming that the authorities  are unwilling to 
permit their stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves to fall outside some 
prescribed  range  of values,  equation (15) suggests  that  nonzero values  of 
def  are not sustainable,  since  such  values of  def  Sust eventually  drive 
the stock of international  reserves  held  by the Central  Bank (R/s)  to its 
upper or lower  bounds.  Sustainability  of a fixed  nominal official  parity 
thus requires def  0 in steady  state. 
Although a balanced government  budget is a necessary  condition for 
sustainability  in our model,  not all paths that satisfy  the steady-state 
condition  def = 0  are feasible.  This condition  will indeed  guarantee 
convergence  of (R/s), but not necessarily  to a value  which lies inside the 
authorities'  preferred  range.  For a given time  path of the  fiscal  vari- 
ables, the role of a nominal  devaluation  in this  model is to alter the 
steady-state  value of (R/s).  To see this,  suppose that  a devaluation  of 
the official rate takes place at time to, at which the economy  may or may 
not be in steady state, but at which time the condition  def — 0  is  ful 
filled.  From (14),  (l6b), and the fact that  a nominal devaluation  does not 
alter the steady-state  value of  rn(m*),  we have 
(22)  m* — 
M0/sP* 
+ 5  [b(u)+def(u)Jdu 
to -  21 
- 
(recall  that Pf is constant).  From (15) and (22) and since  d(cef(ufl/ds 
0, we have that  a nominal  devaluation  will affect  the stock  of international 
reserves as follows: 
(23)  5  b(u)P*du  = 
M0/stP* 
> 0. 
That is,  since  the path of the fiscal  deficit  is unaltered,  and since 
capital gains on reserves  are not monetized,  the original  teal money suoply 
can be restored only  by running cumulative  trade  surpluses--in  other words, 
by reserve  accumulation.  It follows  that,  in the  case  of a tublic spending 
shock, a path rendered  infeasible  by reserve  inadequacy  may he sustainable 
if the eventual  fiscal  adjustment  is accompanied  by a sufficiently  large 
devaluation  of the official  rate.  The reason  for this  is that  such a 
devaluation  will reduce  the cumulative  loss  of reserves  during the 
transition  to the new steady  state.  A  similar  analysis  applies to the case 
of a terms  of trade  shock,  'e now examine  the effects of fiscal  and terms- 
of-trade  shocks  under adjustment-own-devaluation 
2.  Fiscal  Shocks  and Devaluation  Crises 
The effects of an increase  in government  spending  on nontraded goods 
are depicted in Figure  2.  An increase  in g  shifts the i  0  locus to the 
right,  by: 
(l-8)e6(m+v)e  din.  2  >0. 
(l-6)e5(m±v)e4±l 
The  0 locus is undisturbed.  If the increase  in government  spending 
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an  amount  such  as  to  place  the new short-run  equilibrium  at a point  directly 
above A  on the saddle  path S'S'  from then  on, the new steady  state  B would 
be approached. 
Whether such a path is feasible,  however,  depends  on how the  increase 
in spending is financed.  Notice  that,  since  t has  been  held constant in 
(20),  tax financing  has implicitly  been ruled out.  The alternatives  are a 
reduction  in spending  on importables  or central  bank financing.  We will 
examine  the case in which the latter  option  is initially  chosen,  consistent 
with the pre-devaluation  stylized  facts presented  in Section  II. 1/ 
Since we are explicitly  examining  a devaluation  crisis,  at the moment 
that government  spending  increases  the private  sector is assumed to know not 
only that  adjustment  will eventually  be necessary (i.e., that the  spending 
increase  is temporary) 
,  but also that the eventual  adjustment  in spending 
will  be accompanied  by an official  devaluation.  Since the eventual official 
devaluation  is assumed to be anticipated  at the time  of the initial  shock, 
the exchange rate  in  the dual  market  cannot  jump  when the official  exchange 
rate is actually  devalued.  Recalling  that  v = dF/sP and m  M/sP, this 
means that  at the  instant  of  devaluation,  v  and m must decrease in inverse 
proportion  to the change  in s.  Thus,  at  the moment  the devaluation  takes 
place the economy  must move inward  along a ray from the origin such as OR 
in Figure  2.  From a point  such as D,  at the instant  of adjustment  the 
economy  jumps to E.  The point E must be on SS, which governs  the economy's 
post-adjustment;trajectory.  The location  of  0, on the other  hand, is 
determined  by the condition  that DE/E0  as/s,  i.e., by the size of the 
jJ  Of  course,  in this case  the increase  in  g will have to be temporary. -  23  - 
devaluation.  To see how the position of D is determined,  suppose  AS/S 
takes on some known  value,  say  ir  Consider  the family  of rays from the 
origin  of which OR is a member.  Each such  rsy will contain a point such  as 
E where the ray intersects  SS and a point like D with the property DE/ED 
it.  The  set  of  all auth points  D traces out a locua  LL located  above SS and 
with slope given  by: 
dv  dv  —  =  (l+ir) — 
dmILL 
dm 
Notice  that there  will  be one such locus  for aach rate of devaluation 
it.  If  it is knovn  that the fiscal  expansion  will last for t periods  and 
that ita termination  will coincide  with a  it  percent official  devaluation, 
then the location  of the point 0 will  be determined  by the  intersection  of 
the lorua  LL and a path such  as CD which takes exactly  t periods  to reach 
LL from some initial  point  C.  The point  C must lie directly  above  A and 
above the saddle  path 5'S'  - -which  passes  through  the supposed long-run 
equilibrium  B-  -as well aa below LL.  The reason  for this is that from points 
below 5'S'  or above  LL there  are no continuous  trajectories  that  would take 
the economy to  LL.  In the case  under discussion,  therefore,  the dual rate 
will depreciate  on impact,  causing  v to jump to point  C.  From this point, 
v will continue to  depreciate,  and at least  temporarily,  m will rise, 
Notice that the dual rate depreciates  continuously  and eventually  must do so 
at an increasing  rate  (since v/a rises  as the economy  approaches  0 and,  from 
equation (19),  in increase  in this ratio  increases  3) in anticipation  of the 
eventual  devaluation,  which is consistent  with the stylized  facts  presented 
in Section  II.  At the moment  of adjustment  the economy  jumps from 0 to F 24  - 
along OR,  then  gradually  returns to  A  along  SS.  Je can now analyze the 
behavior  of other key macro  variables  under the adjustrnent-cum-devaluation 
path CDEA. 
To  examine the nature  of reserve behavior,  use equations  (3),  (5a), 
(6),  (7),  and (8) in  the trade  balance  equation (13).  The result is: 
(24)  bb(e,p.gZ,t,m+v) 
with: 
-1  8-1 
py  +  +  8(l-G)e  fe  c  -  c2(m+v) >0, 
b2 
—  (lGcl)yX + y  + y  >  0, j/ 
b3  -1, 
b4  8e8c1 > 0, 
b5  -8c2  < 0. 
The sign of b1 assumes that the term  in square brackets is positive, which 
will be the case if the substitution  effects  of a real  devaluation  on 
household  demand  for importables  exceed  wealth effects. 
Using equations  (18) and (24)  ,  and  noticing  that  m+v  rises 
continuously  along  the range  GD, we can show that the trade  balance moves 
into deficit on impact  and the deficit  increases  over time  until adjustment 
is undertaken,  at which  point a surplus must emerge  (point  E in Figure 2) 
Similarly,  the price level jumps on impact  and continues  to rise in the 
period leading  up to the devaluation.  Thus the pre-devaluation  period is 
characterized  by a high and rising  premium  in the dual market,  a trade 
deficit, and inflation,  all of which  were common  features  in the sample  of 
devaluation  episodes  described  in Section  II. 
j/  Although y  < 0, using (2) and (3) we can show that y  > -y. -  25  - 
Notice  that,  given  that the price level  rises  continuously  during  the 
predevaluation  period,  the real exchange rate simultaneously  appreciates. 
Since there  have  been no changes in the determinants  of the equilibrium  real 
exchange  rate,  this real appreciation  represents  a misalignment  situation. 
8y equation 2), the real  wage in terms  of tradables  rises.  Moreover,  if the 
share  of tracables  in the consumption  bundle is sufficiently  large,  the real 
wage measured in terms  of the consumption  bundle  will also rise in the period 
leading  up to the devaluation.  Under this assumption,  the devaluation  of the 
official  rate results  in  a sharp  decrease in the real wage which  causes it to 
fall  below its pre-shock  level.  This is followed  by a gradual  increase in 
the real wage until  its original level  is restored.  Finally,  as can be shown 
from equations  (6),  (7), end (8), the same condition  (a large  value of 8) 
ensures  that private real  consumption  also rises  over this  period.  1/ 
3.  Devaluation  Postponement  and Macroeconomic  Adiustment 
Pc now examine how the dynamics  of adjustment  are affected  by 
postponing  the eventual  measures.  Consider  first  a postponement  of 
adjustment  which holds constant  the size  of the devaluation.  Pc can show 
that as the fiscal  expansion  is prolonged,  the point  C in Figure 2 moves 
closer to the saddle  path  S'S'  --i.e.,  the initial  depreciation  in the dual 
rate is dampened. J  Moreover,  since  the ratio  v/m is smaller  at points 
j/  Notice  that m+v rises  up to point D.  Although  e falls,  if 1-8  is 
small,  equation (8) indicates  that  a will increase,  Since  by (7), y is 
unaffected  by changes in  e, the behavior  of c will depend  on that of a. 
21  Notice  that,  if the economy  jumped  above C,  the new path would 
intersect  LL to  the southwest  of D.  Since the increase  in v along this 
path (call  it CD') is smaller than that  along CD, and since  for each  valne 
of v  on this  path  exceeds  its value along  CD (because  the ratio  v/rn is 
greater),  such paths  must be traversed  in less time  than  CD, which is 
contrary to the assumption  of delayed  adjustment. -  26  - 
below C,  the initial  rate of depreciation  of the dual rate  is also smaller 
in this case.  However,  since  paths  that begin  below C must intersect  LL to 
the northeast  of D, the peak values  of both v  and m. as well as of v+m,  in 
this case exceed  those in  the case of more rapid adjustment.  The larger 
peek value of v+m (reached just prior to adjuatment)  means that the  increase 
in the domestic  price level--and  thus the eventual  degree  of real exchange 
rate  misalignment-  -is larger  the longer  adjustment  is postponed.  It follous 
from the arguments  presented  above  that  peak deviations  of the current 
account,  the real wage,  and real consumption  from their  steady-state  values 
are also larger  the more that adjustment  is postponed. 
Moreover,  postponing  adjustment  also diminishes  the steady-state  stock 
of foreign-exchange  resources.  To see this, use (14) and (15) to write: 
R/s1 
(25)  a 
—p--- +  (s0/s1)P* 5  def(u)du, 
where o  and l  denote  the pre-  and post-devaluation  official exchange 
rate.  Since m  and P  are unchanging  across steady  states,  for a given 
value of O/l  the larger  the cumulative  fiscal deficit (which  dependa 
only on how long  devaluation  is postponed),  the smaller  must F/s1 be. 
If the authorities  pursue  a reserve  target,  the consequences  of post- 
ponement are more dramatic.  As can be verified from  equation (25)  ,  for  a 
given  value  of F/a1,  an increase  in t requires  a reduction  in  sp/s1--i.e. 
a larger  official. devaluation.  Thus,  in the presence  of a reserve target, 
postponing  adjustment  implies  a larger  eventual  official  devaluation. To 
see  the consequences  of this for the economy's  dynamic  behavior,  return to 
Figure  2.  An increase  in r causes the locus  LL to shirt  upwards and become -  27  - 
steeper.  Holding  the duration  of the fiscal expansion  constant,  this would 
in itself  increase  the initial  value of C and the peak values of both v and 
v+m (at the point  D).  Thus an increase  in the size of the eventual official 
devaluation  increases  the peak deviation  of macroeconomic  variables  at the 
instant  just preceding  adjustment  from their  steady-state  values.  More- 
over,  since  the ray OR rotates counterclockwise  in this case,  the point E 
moves to the southeast  along SS.  This implies  that the peak .,g-adjust- 
ment deviations  of v, v+m and the other  macroeconomic  variables from their 
steady-state  values is also increased  by a larger official  devaluation. 
Putting together  the longer  duration  of the fiscal expansion  and the 
larger  official  devaluation  that it implies,  the following  picture  emerges: 
a.  Since  the longer  fiscal  expansion  tends  to lower the initial  value 
of v (is.  ,  the  point C)  while the larger  official  devaluation  tends  to 
raise it, the  impact effects  of postponing  adjustment  in the presence of a 
reserve target  are ambiguous. 
b.  Over time,  however,  the longer  adjustment  is postponed,  the  larger 
the cumulative  deviations  of the macroeconomic  variables  of interest  from 
their  steady-state  values, 
c.  Then adjustment  is finally  undertaken,  these variables  will tend 
to overshoot their  steady-state  values (i.e. ,  the  economy  will be at  E, 
rather  than at  A)  ,  and  the degree  of overshooting  will be magnified  by 
postponing  the adjustment. 
d.  Finally,  since  postponement  requires  a larger official  devaluation 
in the presence of a reserve  target  the legacy  of postponement  will be a 
higher steady-state  price  level. -28- 
4.  Terms-of  Trade Shocks  and Devaluation  Crises 
The analysis  of an adverse  (permanent)  terms  of trade  shock is slightly 
more complicated,  since  in  this case  k2th the t  = 0 and  th =  0  loci are 
affected.  j/  The shift in *  0 is given  by: 
hv 
-r  T  -m2y1v<O. 
while that in  i =  0  is: 
-  _i<0. 
dp  g4  m—O 
Since  both loci shift  to  the left,  in the new steady  state  m will unambigu- 
ously fall,  but v may either  increase  or decrease.  The reduction  in real 
income  attendsnt  upon the terms  of trade  deterioration  causes  domestic 
agents  to seek  to shift  theit  portfolios  away from  money and into foreign 
currency,  thus increasing  v.  On the other  hand,  the reduction  in real 
income  reduces  saving,  and to restore  saving  to its steady  state level  of 
zero, wealth  must fall.  This is partly  brought about  through a reduction in 
v, lesving  the net change  in v ambiguous.  In Figure  3,  we illustrate  the 
case in which the portfolio-composition  effect  on v dominates  the wealth 
effect,  so thatv is higher  in the new steady  state st B.  The steady  state 
j/  We are here considering  an adverse  terms-of-trade  shock  which takes 
the form  of a reduction  in P.  The case of sn increase  in P  is similar, 
except  that the initial  value  of a  will be affected  in this case. Figure  3.  Effects  of  an  Adverse  Terms of Trade 
Shock 
In1  In0 
m 
-  R 
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= o at B  is in principle viable,  since in ohis exercise no fiscal  deficit 
exists  at that  point to generate  continuous  reserve depletion, 
In the absence of devaluation,  the economy would jump to a point such 
as F on the new saddle  path 5'S'  and gradually  converge to B.  This path is 
characterized  by trade  deficits and  serve depletion.  Given a reserve 
target,  the auchoritiea  may instead  prefer  a path which involves an 
official devaluation.  However, unlike  in the previous section, the sire of 
the required official devaluation  is unaffected  by its  timing.  This con he. 
verified from equation (25),  recalling  that in this case the  fiscal  deficit 
remains at zero during the entire  transition  path between steady  states. 
Since the second term on the right  hand aide of (25) drops out,  the reserve 
target  will determine the size of the official  devaluation, but the  final 
reserve outcome  will be independent  of when the devaluation  takes place.  On 
the other hand,  as will be shown  below,  the timing  of adjustment (in the 
form of the official devaluation)  again  aatters in determining the paths 
followed  by the main macroeconomic  variables. 
Suppose, for concreteness,  that the authorities  ohooae the magnitude of 
the official devaluation  such as to preserve the original level  of reserves 
measured in terms of foreign  currency.  Then,  if the  terms  of trade deter- 
ioration is accompanied  by an immediate  official devaluation  of (aq-a1)/aq 
oercenc (Figure  3),  the economy  will immediately  move from the original 
steady state at A to the new one ac  B, without undergoing an intervening 
sequence  of trade  deficits.  If the exchange rate adjustment  is postponed, 
however, again m and v must contract along  a  ray  from  the origin at the 
instant of devaluation,  from  a point such as  D  on  the ray OR1,  to  a  point 
such  as F on the new saddle  path B'S'.  For  this  no be possible, the Initial  jump in v must be to a point ge  this saddle  path.  and since t' 
- 
implies  a sequence of trade  deficits (because  ru is falling)  it must be 
ffset  by eventual surpluses--i.e.  the post-devaluation  point must be 
located to the  southwest  of B along S'S'  .  The  implied  transition  path  is 
CDEB  with an initial  depreciation  of the dual rate,  1/  This is followed 
y gradual  appreciation  and then by an accelerating  depreciation. 
The behavior of the remaining  macroeconomic  variables that concern us 
ver the  range CD of the adjustrent  tath cannot  be determined  unambiguous- 
1y  since  the terms of trade  deerioration  and the depreciation in the dual 
atkt  have conflicting  effects on the real exchange rate and therefore on 
enables such as the price level,  the real wage,  and real consumption. 
owever,  at the moment  of devaluation,  the real exchange  rate undergoes a 
tap depreciation,  accompanied  by a reduction  in the real wage and real 
onsumption, this again assuming a sufficiently  large share of tradables in 
'he consumption  bundle.  As the trade balance goes into surplus with a 
epreciating  dual rate over the final segment  EB,  real exchange rate appre- 
ciation is accompanied  by a rising  real wage and rising  real consumption. 
In tne event that devaluation  is further postponed,  the ray OR will 
rotate counterclockwise,  to OR2,  say,  as the point C moves along the locus 
LL (derrvd  as in the previous section',.  In this  case,  the initial 
lepreciatiori must be to a point  between F and C  such as C,  and the economy 
will follow tne more prolonged  adjustment  trajectory  GHIB. / Thus  the 
/ The  initial  point  C must be  " =  0  to  ensure  convergence to a 
point D on the ray OR with the property  DE/DO  (mo-ml)/mo. 
2./  That the paths such as OH,  located  CD require  more time to 
traverse than  CD follows  from the fact that,  for each m,  the trade deficit 
on CD exceeds that on  GH,  yet the cumulative  deficit along  OH (the 
reduction in m) exceeds that along  CD.  It follows  that,  in the case -  33 
poe-devaluation period is characterized  by trade deficits and increasing 
premiums in the dual exchange  market  which increase at an accelerating race 
(since  v/rn rises). 
The effects of postponing adjustment  on the deviations  of macrovari- 
ables from their steady-state  values is quite different in the present case 
from the case of a temporary fiscal  expansion.  Since LL has a positive 
slope,  the peak values reached  by both v and  v+rn in the period leading up 
to the officiaL devaluation  are smaller when the devaluation  is postponed. 
Thus the peak deviation  of the macrovariables  from their  steady-state values 
during this  period is diminished  when adjustment  is postponed, in contract 
to what is observed under  a temporary  fiscal  expansion.  However, at the 
point  H the cumulative  reserve loss exceeds  that at D  (notice  that m is 
smaller),  so that larger  cumulative  trade  surpluses are needed in the poso- 
adjustment  period.  Thus the point I  is to the southwest  of E on S'S'  in 
Figure 3,  and the -sdjustment  deviations  of macrovariables  from their 
steady-state  values are magnified,  as in the previous section. 
In the case of a permanent terms  of trade shock,  in  which "adjustment 
consists of an official  devaluation  designed to meet a reserve target.  we 
therefore  conclude that: 
a.  Postponement  of adjustment  g.g.g the  impact  effect  of the shock on 
macroeconomic  variables. 
h,  Similarly,  with the exception  of foreign exchange reserves and the 
money supply,  the cumulative  deviation  of macrovariablea  from their steady- 
state  values  prior to adjustment is smaller  when adjustment  is postponed. 
(Contd.  from page 29) of prolonged  adjustment,  the  initial  jump from point 
A must  be to a path below CD,  rather  than to one above It. c,  dowever,  as in the case of a temporary fiscal,  expansion,  post- 
ponement  magnifies post-adjustment  overshooting. 
d.  In this case,  postponement  does not affect the steady-state  vol 
of domestic nominal  variables. 
7.  'one i'd' nz  Remarks 
Adjustment  programs in developing  countries are usually the  conseque 
of  severe  macroeconomic  crises.  Thesc  crises have tended  to share a number 
common  features, such as are  accc.Lrration in the  rate of inflation. 
continuous appreciation  of the oefictal real exchange rate,  an increase in 
tbm current account  deficit,  the sustained  depletion  of foreign exchange 
reserves, ano a continuously-increasing  premium in the black market for 
foreign  exchange.  When adjustment  is undertaken  it usually includes a 
substantial  devaluation  of the official rate,  following  which the parallel 
market premium shrinks  appreciably.  The purpose of this paper has been to 
derive a dynamic model that is able to capture these  common features  of 
balance of payments crises.  An important  property of the model is that it 
allows us to analyze the consequences of different timings of adjustment. 
The opening section of the paper contains  a brief discussion  of 20 
major devaluation  episodes  in the developing  countries.  From this analysis 
we derive  a list of "stylized  facts"  that we believe models  of macroeconomic 
aj'astment  should account  for.  In Section  III  the model is presented.  The 
model is based on fully  articulated  micro-principles  and considers an 
economy that produces three goods  The public holds domestic and foreign 
money, and there are dual exchange rates.  An important  feature 0f the model 
is that the Central Bank  has a well-defined  demand for  international 
reserves.  In Section IV we use the model to analyze how the economy reacts to two  types  of shocks:  (1) an increase in government  consumption of 
nontradables  financed  with domestic  credit creation;  and (2) a negative 
shock to terms  of trade.  We show that in this model the adjustment path 
followed  by inflation,  the current  account,  the real exchange rate,  waqes. 
the parallel market  premium and net foreign  assets correspond  closely oo the 
stylized facts described  in Section  II of the paper. 
A central result  of our analysis refers  to the consequences of post- 
poning the adjqstment  when the Central Bank has a well-defined target for 
international  reserves.  We show that the effects of postponement will 
depend on the type of shook.  If the disturbance  is a fiscal expansion. 
postponing the adjustment  will require  a larger  official devaluation.  boy- 
ever,  this relationship  between the timing  of the devaluation  and its 
magnitude is not linear.  If the postponement  period  is doubled the  cequited 
magnitude of the devaluation  will not double. ' Delaying the adjustment 
will affect the path followed  by the endogenous  variables.  In partiouloc. 
the  longer  adjustment  is postponed,  the  larger  will be the deviations of the 
matro  variables from their steady-state  values,  When adjustment is finally 
implemented  the macro  variables  will tend to overshoot their steady state 
values.  The extent  of overshooting  will depend  on the postponement period: 
a delayed adjustment  magnifies the extent of the overshooting. 
For the case of a negative terms  of trade  disturbance, the size of the 
official  devaluation  will be unaffected  by the timing  of the adjustment. 
Furthermore,  the longer  the adjustment  is postponed,  the smaller will be  the 
peak deviation  of the macrovariables  (except  for reserves  and money) froa 
j/  This can be verified  by implicitly  differentiatina  equation (25) -  34 
their steady state  values.  However,  as in the case of fiscal  shock, folIov 
ing adjustment the required degree  of overshooting  of the macro variablea 
will be magnified by postponement. 
An  mportant conclusion  of our analysis on the effects of the  timirg 
of adjustment is that the observed  pattern of continuously rising  black 
market premla, rising  inflation,  and increasing  current account deficits 
can  be unambiguously inferred  only in the context of sufficiently  post- 
poned adjustment.  The suggestion  it that "devaluation  crisis" episodes 
in developing countries  have resulted  not so much from the occurrence  of 
domestit or external shocks,  but from a failure  to adjust promptly in 
response to such shocks. 
Although the model presented  here goes a long  way toward  tying 
together the more salient  features of devaluation  crises in developing 
countries  it has some limitations.  In particular, it fails to incorporate 
at least two important issues,  First,  since there  is no capital mobility 
the  official rate is available  only for current transactions  and there 
are no Leacagea  between markets) the role of capital flight is not investi- 
gated.  Second  since our model exhibits  continuous full employment,  the 
dynamics of real output  over the course of the crisis-adjustment  period have 
been omitted.  while both phenomena  are of substantial  empirical and 
anslytica,  interest,  their incorporation  into our framework  would add 
substantially to the model'  complexity  and they therefore  remain topics 
for future  research,  j/ 
1/  In particular adding  endogenous  capital flows triggered  by perceived 
interest rate differentials  would result in a system with three state 
variables, 4PPENDI.X 
Macro Data For 20 Devaluation  Episodes 
Table  A.l  Terms  of Trade in Period Preceding  Devaluation  Crises 
Year of  3 Years  1 Year 
Country  Devaluation  Crisis  Prior  Prior 
A  iDevaliQ.fl 




Colombia  1965  100.0  109.3  1ll.L 
Costa  Rica  1974  - 
Cyprus  1967  100.0  110.3  1069 
Guyana  1967 
-  - 
103.2  India  1966  100.0  99.5 
Israel  1962  100.0  100.8  lO3Y) 
Israel  1967  100.0  106.1  100.1 
Israel  1971  100.0  97.2  99.2 
Nicaragua  1979  100.0  94.2 
Pakistan  1972  100.0w  87.0 
97.5 
95.6 
Sri Lanka  1967  100,0  102.3  95 
Yugoslavia  1965  100.0  100.9  100.7 




Chile  1982 
-  -  - 
Colombia  1967  100.0  80.9  9S.3 
Kenya  1981  100.0  84.5 
89.0  Korea  1980  100.0  102.5 
Mexico  1976 
-  -  - 
Mexico  1982  -  -  - 
Pakistan  1982  100.0  77.3  75.0 
Average  100.0  86.3  82.9 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. 
*This number refers  to two,  rather  than three,  years prior to the 
devaluation. -  36  -  APPENDIX 
Table  A.  2  Evolution  of Net Foreign  Assets and Current Account 
In Period Preceding Devaluation 





(Current  Account,' 
GDP 
-3 Years  -l lear  -3 Years  -Y Year 
Colombia  1962  1.2  -1.8  0.016  -0.030 
Colombia  2965  -10.7  -11.6  -0022  -0.030 
Costa Rica  1974  12.8  16.7  -0.119  -0.091 
Cyprus  1967  49.8  55.0  -0.134  -0072 
Guyana  1967  62.6  33.0  -0.063 
• 
-0.142 
India  1966  2.3  1.2  -0.025  -0.029 
Israel  1962  20.7  30.6  -0.180  -0.179 
Israel  2967  42.3  34.3  -0.236  -0.145 
Israel  2971  29.4  3.5  -0.195  -0.259 
Nicaragua  2979  16.8  -35.5  -0.028  -0.009 
Pakistan  1972  7.5  3.9  -0.028  -0.029 
Sri Lanka  2967  5.2  -0.5  -0.025  -0.039 
Yugoslavia  2965  2.3  -0.9  -0.017  -0.031 
Chile  1982  24,2  16.4  -0.062  -0.155 
Colombia  1v7  -11.6  -8.8  -0.030  -0.047 
Kenya  1981  13.4  20.2  -0.156  -0.246 
Korea  2980  13.2  1.8  -0.019  -0.072 
Mexico  1976  14.3  9.5  -0.025  -0.044 
Mexico  1982  7.5  6.8  -0.038  -0.052 
Pakistan  1982  4.3  2.1  -0.030  -0.012 
Source:  Constructed from IFS data. 
5Ratio of Net Foreign assets to the  suni  of net  Eoreign  assets plus 
domestic credit x 100.  (Lines  31N  over  the  sum of Lines  3lN +  32 of IFS). Table  A, I  Evolution of  Real  Exchange  Rate  Inoexes  During 
Three  Years Prior to  Devaluation 
itt '  Yer P'ior to flevaluation 






-3  Years  -1.  Year  -3 Years.  -1 Year' 
Colombia  1962  108.1  100  105.7  100 
Colombia  1965  155.7  100  123.8  lOG 
Costa Rica  1974  101.6  100  93.9  100 
Cyprus  1967  95.8  100  97.2  100 
Guyana  1967  99.7  100  100.1  100 
India  1966  121.2  100  119.7  100 
Israel  1962  105.9  100  108.4  100 
Israel  1967  107.0  100  112.0  100 
Israel  1971  102,5  100  104,8  100 
Nicaragua  1979  101.9  100  95.3  100 
Pakistan  1972  105.1  100  97.9  100 
Sri Lanka  1967  95.2  100  92.2  100 
Yugoslavia  1965  117.7  100  120.5  100 
Chile  1982  129.9  100  140.6  100 
Colombiaa  1967  (78.7)  100  (83.1)  100 
Kenya  1981  93.5  100  93.1  100 
Korea  1980  111.6  100  112.9  100 
Mexico  1976  109.2  100  108.6  100 
Mexico  1982  112.9  100  128.2  100 
Pakistan  1982  100.6  100  115.2  100 
Average  109.2  100  109.0  100 
Source:  Real exchange  rates  indexes  constructed  as described in the 
aColombia devalued in 1965.  This explains the evolution of RER index 
before 1967. -  38  -  APPENDIX 
Table  A.4  Parallel Market  Premia 
In Period Prior to Devaluations 
(Parallel  Market Premium (oerretae 
Country  Year  -3 Yrs.  -9 Mths.  -3 Mths.  -L Montr 
Colombia  1962  11.1  33.4  34.7  58.0 
Colombia  1965  37.5  42.8  110.6  1L4,— 
Costa Rica  1974  0.5  42.2  34.7  30.2 
India  1966  51.9  77.5  131.1  134.2 
Israel  1962  -0.6  36.3  46.9  50.8 
Israel  1967  7.8  5.6  13.9  9.9 







































Mexico  1976  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Mexico  1982  0.0  5,4  11.7  12.5 
Pakistan  1982  n.e.  33.8  48.5  40.9 
Source:  Picks Currency Yearbook,  or1d's Currency Yearbook and IFS; 
various issues. -  39  -  APPENDIX 
Table  A.5  Manufacturing  Real  Wage Rate Indexes  in Devaluing Countries 
(Year  Prior to Devaluation  100) 
Year of 
Country  Year  -3 Yrs.  -2 Yrs.  -1 Yr.  0ev.  +1  Yr.  Yrs.  +3 Yrs. 
Colombia  1962  na.  94.2  100  112.0  117.9  114.1  122.3 
Colombia  1965  98.1  103.3  100  107.1  101.6  103.7  108.1 
Cyprus  1967  80.5  86,5  100  96.2  98.6  107.9  113.7 
Guyana  1967  na.  na.  100  114.9  129.4  141.9  146,2 
India  1966  105.6  97.9  100  97.7  92.5  97.1  100.9 
Israel  1962  94.1  96.9  100  100.2  108.9  109.8  120.5 
Israel  1967  85.7  94.0  100  102.1  107.8  107.8  112.9 
Israel  1971  95.5  95.4  100  98.0  100.1  102.7  101.9 
Nicaragua  1979  104.4  99.2  100  87.5  81.7  na.  na. 
Pakistan  1972  116.3  109.2  100  101.2  145.2  122.5  112.4 
Sri Lanka  1967  96.5  97.9  100  98.8  102.0  96.5  98.6 
Yugoslavia  1965  74.0  85.8  100  103.7  112.8  116.5  122.1 
Chile  1982  78.5  89.1  100  100.4  106.3  103.1  no. 
Colombia  1967  98.3  105.3  100  102.0  106.3  105.7  115.7 
Kenya  1981  100.8  98.5  100  99.4  91.6  88.9  n.e. 
Korea  1980  78.3  91.9  100  95.3  94.4  101.0  109.6 
Mexico  1976  91.9  '95.2  100  108.0  109.8  107.6  106.5 
Mexico  1982  101.5  97.5  100  99.5  72.4  69.8  n.e. 
Pakistan  1982  126.4  105.5  100  n.a.  n.a.  n.m.  n.e. 
Source:  Constructed  from data obtained from the International  Labor Office 
and the International  Monetary Fund. 40  APPENDIX 
Table  A.6  Countries in Control Group 
Country  IFS Country Code  Year of Study 
Cots d'Ivoire  662  1965-1977 
Dominican Republic  243  1960-1980 
Ecuador  248  1971-1980 
Egypt  469  1960-1971 
El Salvador  253  1960-1980 
Ethiopia  644  1960-1970 
Greece  174  1960-1973 
Guatemala  258  1960-1980 
Honduras  268  1960-1980 
Iran  429  1960-1971 
Iraq  433  1960-1971 
Jordan  439  1960-1971 
Malaysia  548  1960-1970 
Mexico  273  1960-1974 
Nicaragua  278  1960-1977 
Nigeria  694  1960-1970 
Panama  283  1960-1980 
Paraguay  288  1960-1982 
Singapore  576  1960-1970 
Sudan  732  1960-1976 
Thailand  578  1960-1971 
Tunisia  744  1960-1970 
Venezuela  299  1965-1981 
Zambia  754  1960-1971 -  4i.  - 
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